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Abstract
Collaborative learning allows participants to jointly train a model without data
sharing. To update the model parameters, the central server broadcasts model
parameters to the clients, and the clients send updating directions such as gradients
to the server. While data do not leave a client device, the communicated gradients
and parameters will leak a client’s privacy. Prior work proposed attacks that infer
client’s privacy from gradients and parameters. They also showed that simple
defenses such as dropout and differential privacy do not help much.
We propose a practical defense which we call Double Blind Collaborative Learning
(DBCL). The high-level idea is to apply random matrix sketching to the parameters
(aka weights) and re-generate random sketching after each iteration. DBCL pre-
vents malicious clients from conducting gradient-based privacy inference which are
the most effective attacks. DBCL works because from the attacker’s perspective,
sketching is effectively random noise that outweighs the signal. Notably, DBCL
does not increase the computation and communication cost much and does not hurt
test accuracy at all.
1 Introduction
Collaborative learning allows multiple parties to jointly train a model using their private data but
without sharing the data. Collaborative learning is motivated by real-world applications, for example,
training a model using but without collecting mobile user’s data.
Distributed stochastic gradient descent (SGD), as illustrated in Figure 1, is perhaps the simplest
approach to collaborative learning. Specifically, the central server broadcasts model parameters to
the clients, each client uses a batch of local data to evaluate a stochastic gradient, and the server
Server
parameters
gradient
gradient
parameters⋯
Figure 1: Collaborative learning with a
central parameter server
aggregates the stochastic gradients and updates the model
parameters. Based on distributed SGD, communication-
efficient algorithms such as federated averaging (FedAvg)
[32] and FedProx [39] have been developed and analyzed
[26, 43, 48, 52, 57].
Collaboratively learning seemingly protects clients’ pri-
vacy. Unfortunately, it has been demonstrated not true by
recent studies [19, 33, 58]. Even if a client’s data do not
leave his device, important properties of his data can be
disclosed from the model parameters and gradients. To
infer other clients’ data, the attacker needs only to control
one client device and access the model parameters in every
iteration; the attacker does not have to take control of the
server [19, 33, 58].
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The reason why the attacks work is that model parameters and gradients carry important information
about the training data [2, 14]. In [19], the jointly learned model is used as a discriminator for training
a generator which generates other clients’ data. In [33], gradient is used for inferring other clients’
data properties. In [58], model parameters and gradients are both used for reproducing other clients’
data. Judging from published empirical studies, the gradient-based attacks [33, 58] are more effective
than the parameter-based attack [19]. Our goal is to defend the gradient-based attacks.
Simple defenses, e.g., differential privacy [12] and dropout [42], have been demonstrated not working
well by [19, 33]. While differential privacy [12], i.e., adding noise to model parameters or gradients,
works if the noise is strong, the noise evitably hurts the accuracy and may even stop the collaborative
learning from making progress [19]. If the noise is not strong enough, clients’ privacy will leak.
Dropout training [42] randomly masks a fraction of the parameters, making the clients have access to
only part of the parameters in each iteration. However, knowing part of the parameters is sufficient
for conducting the attacks.
1.1 Our Contributions and Limitations
We propose Double-Blind Collaborative Learning (DBCL) as a practical defense against gradient-
based attacks, e.g., [33, 58]. Using DBCL, one client cannot make use of gradients to infer other
clients’ privacy. DBCL applies random sketching to every or some layers of a neural network, and the
random sketching matrices are regenerated after each iteration. Throughout the training, the clients
do not see the real model parameters, and the server does not see any real gradient or descending
direction. This is why we call our method double-blind.
DBCL has the following nice properties. First, DBCL does not hinder test accuracy at all. Second,
DBCL does not increase the per-iteration time complexity and communication complexity, although
it reasonably increases the iterations for attaining convergence. Last but not least, to apply DBCL to
dense layers and convolutional layers, no additional tuning is needed.
While we propose DBCL as a practical defense against gradient-based attacks at little cost, we do not
claim DBCL as a panacea. DBCL has two limitations. First, with DBCL applied, a malicious client
cannot perform gradient-based attacks, but he may be able to perform parameter-based attacks such
as [19]; fortunately, the latter is much less effective than the former. Second, DBCL cannot prevent a
malicious server from inferring clients’ privacy, although DBCL makes the server’s attack much less
effective.
In sum, DBCL can defend gradient-based attacks conducted by a client and make other types of
attacks less effective. We admit that DBCL alone does not fundamentally defend all the attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any defense that is effective for all the attacks
that infer privacy. DBCL can be easily incorporated with existing methods such as homomorphic
encryption and secret sharing to defend more attacks.
1.2 Paper Organization
Section 2 introduces neural network, backpropagation, and matrix sketching. Section 3 defines
threat models. Section 4 describes the algorithm, including the computation and communication.
Section 5 presents empirical results to demonstrate that DBCL does not harm test accuracy, does
not much increase the communication cost, and can defend gradient-based attacks. Section 6
theoretically studies DBCL. Section 7 discusses some closely relevant work. Algorithm derivations
and theoretical proofs are in the appendix. The source code is available at the Github repo: https:
//github.com/MengjiaoZhang/DBCL.git
2 Preliminaries
Dense layer. Let din be the input shape, dout be the output shape, and b be the batch size. Let
X ∈ Rb×din be the input, W ∈ Rdout×din be the parameter matrix, and Z = XWT be the output.
After the dense (aka fully-connected) layer, there is typically an activation function σ(Z) applied
elementwisely.
Backpropagation. Let L be the loss evaluated on a batch of b training samples. We derive
backpropagation for the dense layer by following the convention of PyTorch. Let G , ∂ L∂ Z ∈ Rb×dout
be the gradient received from the upper layer. We need to compute the gradients:
2
∂ L
∂X
= GW ∈ Rb×din and ∂ L
∂W
= GTX ∈ Rdout×din ,
which can be established by the chain rule. We use ∂ L∂W to update the parameter matrix W by e.g.,
W←W − η ∂ L∂W , and pass ∂ L∂X to the lower layer.
Uniform sampling matrix. We call S ∈ Rdin×s a uniform sampling matrix if its columns are
sampled from the set
{√
din√
s
e1, · · · ,
√
din√
s
edin
}
uniformly at random. Here, ei is the i-th standard basis
of Rdin . We call S a uniform sampling matrix because XS contains s randomly sampled (and scaled)
columns of X. Random matrix theories [10, 30, 31, 51] guarantee that ES
[
XSSTWT
]
= XW and
that ‖XSSTWT −XW‖ is bounded, for any X and W.
CountSketch. We call S ∈ Rdin×s a CountSketch matrix [6, 8, 36, 45, 50] if it is constructed in the
following way. Every row of S has exactly one nonzero entry whose position is randomly sampled
from [s] , {1, 2, · · · , s} and value is sampled from {−1,+1}. Here is an example of S (10× 3):
ST =
 0 0 1 −1 1 −1 0 0 0 0−1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 −1 0
0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 .
CountSketch has very similar properties as random Gaussian matrices [20, 51]. We use CountSketch
for its computation efficiency. Given X ∈ Rb×din , the CountSketch X˜ = XS can be computed
in O(dinb) time. CountSketch is much faster than the standard matrix multiplication which has
O(dinbs) time complexity. Theories in [8, 34, 35, 51] guarantee that ES
[
XSSTWT
]
= XW and
that ‖XSSTWT−XW‖ is bounded, for any X and W. In practice, S is never explicitly constructed.
3 Threat Models
In this paper, we consider the attacks and defenses under the setting of client-server architecture and
assume the attacker controls a client.1 Let Wold and Wnew be the model parameters (aka weights)
in two consecutive iterations. The server broadcasts Wold to the clients, the m clients use Wold
and their local data to compute ascending directions ∆1, · · · ,∆m (e.g., gradients), and the server
aggregates the directions by ∆ = 1m
∑m
i=1 ∆i and performs the update Wnew ←Wold −∆. Since
a client (say the k-th) knows Wold, Wnew, and his own direction ∆k, he can calculate the sum of
other clients’ directions by∑
i 6=k
∆i = m∆−∆k = m
(
Wold −Wnew
)−∆k. (1)
In the case of two-party collaborative learning, that is, m = 2, one client knows the updating direction
of the other client.
Knowing the model parameters, gradients, or both, the attacker can use various ways [19, 33, 58] to
infer other clients’ privacy. We focus on gradient-based attacks [33, 58], that is, the victim’s privacy
is extracted from the gradients. Melis et al. (2019) [33] built a classifier and locally trained it for
property inference. The classifier takes the updating direction ∆i as input feature and predicts the
clients’ data properties. The client’s data cannot be recovered, however, the classifier can tell, e.g.,
the photo is likely female. Zhu et al. (2019) [58] developed an optimization method called gradient
matching for recovering other clients’ data; both gradient and model parameters are used. It has been
shown that simple defenses such as differential privacy [13, 12] and dropout [41] cannot defend the
attacks.
In decentralized learning, where participants are compute nodes in a peer-to-peer network, a node
knows its neighbors’ model parameters and thus updating directions. A malicious node can infer
the privacy of its neighbors in the same way as [33, 58]. In Appendix C, we discuss the attack and
defense in decentralized learning; they will be our future work.
4 Proposed Method: Double-Blind Collaborative Learning (DBCL)
We present the high-level ideas in Section 4.1, elaborate on the implementation in Section 4.2, and
analyze the time and communication complexities in Section 4.3.
1A stronger assumption would be that the server is malicious. Our defense may not defeat a malicious server.
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4.1 High-Level Ideas
The attacks of [33, 58] need the victim’s updating direction, e.g., gradient, for inferring the victim’s
privacy. Using standard distributed algorithms such as distributed SGD and Federated Averaging
(FedAvg) [32], the server can see the clients’ updating directions, ∆1, · · · ,∆m, and the clients can
see the jointly learned model parameter, W. A malicious client can use (1) to get other clients’
updating directions and then perform the gradient-based attacks such as [33, 58].
To defend the gradient-based attacks, our proposed Double-Blind Collaborative Learning (DBCL)
applies random sketching to the parameter matrices and regenerate random sketching after each
iteration. From the normal clients’ perspective, the sketching is similar to dropout regularization
which does not hurt accuracy; see Section 6.3. From the malicious client’s perspective, the sketching
is effectively random noise that outweighs “signal” in the gradient; see (3).
To be more specific, only the server knows the true model parameters, W. What the server broadcasts
to the clients are random sketches of W, and the sketching matrix varies after each iteration. Let Wold
and Wnew be the true model parameters in two consecutive iterations; they are known to only the
server. What the clients observe are the random sketches: W˜old = WoldSold and W˜new = WnewSnew.
We explain why we use random projection rather than random sampling. The attacker (a malicious
client) needs to know the gradient ∆ = Wold −Wnew (approximately) in order to conduct any
gradient-based attack. With s = 0.5din, which is the typical setting of dropout training, uniform
sampling randomly masks 50% of the columns of Wold and Wnew. Unfortunately, even with the
random mask, the attacker still knows 25% of the columns of ∆ and can perform the attack, although
less effectively. If S is random projection such as CountSketch [51] or random Gaussian matrix [20],
the attacker’s observation of ∆ is very noisy; see Section 6.
4.2 Algorithm Description
We describe the computation and communication operations of DBCL. We consider the client-server
architecture, dense layers, and the distributed SGD algorithm.2 DBCL works in the following four
steps. Broadcasting and aggregation are communication operations; forward pass and backward pass
are local computations performed by each client for calculating gradients.
Broadcasting. The central server generates a new seed ψ3 and then a random sketch: W˜ = WS.
It broadcasts ψ and W˜ ∈ Rdout×s to all the clients through message passing. Here, the sketch size s is
determined by the server and must be set smaller than din; the server can vary s after each iteration.
Local forward pass. The i-th client randomly selects a batch of b samples from its local dataset
and then locally performs a forward pass. Let the input of a dense layer be Xi ∈ Rb×din . The client
uses the seed ψ to draw a sketch X˜i = XiS ∈ Rb×s and computes Zi = X˜iW˜T . Then σ(Zi)
becomes the input of the upper layer, where σ is some activation function. Repeat this process for all
the layers. The forward pass finally outputs Li, the loss evaluated on the batch of b samples.
Local backward pass. Let the local gradient propagated to the dense layer be Gi , ∂ Li∂ Zi ∈ Rb×dout .
The client locally calculates
Γi = G
T
i X˜i ∈ Rdout×s and ∂ Li
∂Xi
= GiW˜S
T ∈ Rb×din .
The gradient ∂ Li∂Xi is propagated to the lower-level layer to continue the backpropagation.
Aggregation. The server aggregates {Γi}mi=1 to compute Γ = 1m
∑m
i=1 Γi; this needs a communi-
cation. Let L = 1m
∑m
i=1 Li be the loss evaluated on the batch of mb samples. It can be shown that
∂ L
∂W
=
1
m
m∑
i=1
∂ Li
∂W
= ΓST ∈ Rdout×din . (2)
The server then updates the parameters by, e.g., W←W − η ∂ L∂W .
2DBCL works also for convolutional layers; see Appendix A.2 for the details. DBCL can be easily extended
to FedAvg or other communication-efficient frameworks. DBCL can be applied to peer-to-peer networks; see
the discussions in Appendix C.
3Let the clients use the same pseudo-random number generator as the server. Given the seed ψ, all the clients
can construct the same sketching matrix S.
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4.3 Time Complexity and Communication Complexity
DBCL does not increase the time complexity of local computations. The CountSketch, X˜i = XiS
and W˜i = WiS, costs O(bdin) and O(dindout) time, respectively. Using CountSketch, the overall
time complexity of a forward and a backward pass isO(bdin + dindout + bsdout). Since we set s < din
to protect privacy, the time complexity is lower than the standard backpropagation, O(bdindout).
DBCL does not increase per-iteration communication complexity. Without using sketching, the
communicated matrices are W ∈ Rdout×din and ∂ Li∂W ∈ Rdout×din . Using sketching, the communicated
matrices are W˜ ∈ Rdout×s and Γi ∈ Rdout×s. Because s < din, the per-iteration communication
complexity is lower than the standard distributed SGD.
5 Experiments
We conduct experiments to demonstrate that first, DBCL does not harm test accuracy, second, DBCL
does not increase the communication cost too much, and third, DBCL can defend the gradient-based
attacks of [33, 58].
5.1 Experiment Setting
Our method and the compared methods are implemented using PyTorch. The experiments are
conducted on a server with 4 NVIDIA GeForce Titan V GPUs, 2 Xeon Gold 6134 CPUs, and 192
GB memory. We follow the settings of the relevant papers to perform comparisons.
Three datasets are used in the experiments. MNIST has 60,000 training images and 10,000 test
images; each image is 28× 28. CIFAR-10 has 50,000 training images and 10,000 test images; each
image is 32× 32× 3. Labeled Faces In the Wild (LFW) has 13,233 faces of 5,749 individuals; each
face is a 64× 47× 3 color image.
5.2 Accuracy and Efficiency
We conduct experiments on the MNIST, CIFAR-10, and LFW datasets to show that first, DBCL does
not hinder prediction accuracy, and second, it does not much increase the communication cost. The
learning rates are tuned to optimize the convergence rate.
MNIST classification. We build a multilayer perceptron (MLP) and a convolutional neural network
(CNN) for the multi-class classification task. The MLP has 3 dense layers: Dense(200)⇒ ReLU
⇒ Dense(200)⇒ ReLU⇒ Dense(10)⇒ Softmax. The CNN has 2 convolutional layers and
2 dense layers: Conv(32, 5 × 5)⇒ ReLU⇒ MaxPool(2 × 2)⇒ Conv(64, 5 × 5)⇒ ReLU⇒
MaxPool(2× 2)⇒ Flatten⇒ Dense(512)⇒ ReLU⇒ Dense(10)⇒ Softmax.
We use Federated Averaging (FedAvg) to train the MLP and CNN. We follow the setting of [32]. The
data are partitioned among 100 (virtual) clients uniformly at random. Between two communications,
FedAvg performs local computation for 1 epoch (for MLP) or 5 epochs (for CNN). The batch size of
local SGD is set to 10.
Sketching is applied to all the dense and convolutional layers except the output layer. We set the
sketch size s = din/2; thus, the per-iteration communication complexity is reduced by half. With
sketching, the MLP and CNN are trained by FedAvg under the same setting.
Table 1: Experiments on MNIST. The table shows the rounds of communications for attaining the
test accuracy. Here, c is the participation ratio of FedAvg, that is, in each round, only a fraction of
clients participate in the training..
Models Accuracy Communication Rounds
c = 1% c = 10% c = 20% c = 50% c = 100%
MLP 0.97 222 96 84 83 82
MLP-Sketch 0.97 828 429 416 415 408
CNN 0.99 462 309 97 91 31
CNN-Sketch 0.99 344 126 56 46 55
We show the experimental results in Table 1. Trained by FedAvg, the small MLP can only reach
97% validation accuracy, while the CNN can obtain 99% test accuracy. Under all the settings, using
sketching does not hinder test accuracy at all. We show the rounds of communications for attaining
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the test accuracies. For the MLP, sketching needs 5x communications to converge. For the CNN,
sketching does not increase communication cost.
CIFAR-10 classification. We build a CNN with 3 convolutional layers and 2 dense layers:
Conv(32, 5× 5)⇒ ReLU⇒ Conv(64, 5× 5)⇒ ReLU⇒MaxPool(2× 2)⇒ Conv(128, 5× 5)
⇒ ReLU⇒ MaxPool(2× 2)⇒ Flatten⇒ Dense(200)⇒ ReLU⇒ Dense(10)⇒ Softmax.
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Figure 2: Experiment on CIFAR-10 dataset.
The CNN is also trained using
FedAvg. We follow the setting of [32].
The data are partitioned among 100
clients. We set the participation ratio
to c = 10%, that is, each time only
10% uniformly sampled clients partic-
ipate in the training. Between two
communications, FedAvg performs
local computation for 5 epochs. The
batch size of local SGD is set to 50.
We do not use tricks such as data aug-
mentation.
Figure 2 shows the convergence curves. Using sketching does not hinder the validation accuracy at
all; on the contrary, it marginally improves the validation accuracy. The reason is likely that sketching
is an adaptive regularization similar to dropout [42, 47]; see the discussions in Section 6.3.
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Figure 3: Gender classification on the LWF
dataset.
LFW classification (class-imbalanced). Fol-
lowing [33], we conduct binary classification
experiments on a subset of the LFW dataset.
We use 8150 faces for training and 3, 400
for test. The task is gender prediction. We
build a CNN with 3 convolutional layers and
3 dense layers: Conv(64, 3 × 3) ⇒ ReLU
⇒ MaxPool(2 × 2) ⇒ Conv(64, 3 × 3) ⇒
ReLU⇒MaxPool(2×2)⇒ Conv(128, 3×3)
⇒ ReLU ⇒ MaxPool(2 × 2) ⇒ Flatten ⇒
Dense(32)⇒ ReLU⇒ Dense(32)⇒ ReLU
⇒ Dense(1)⇒ Sigmoid. We apply sketching
to all the convolutional and dense layers except
the output layer. The model is trained by dis-
tributed SGD (2 clients and 1 server) with a learning rate of 0.01 and a batch size of 32.
The dataset is class-imbalanced: 8957 are males, and 2593 are females. Using classification accuracy
for imbalanced dataset is a bad idea. In Figure 3, we plot the ROC curves to compare the standard
CNN and the sketched one. The two ROC curves are almost the same. Using sketching, the true
positive rate is marginally worse than the standard CNN.
5.3 Defending Gradient-Based Attacks
We empirically study whether DBCL can defend the gradient-based attacks of [33] and [58]. Our
setting is two-party (m = 2) and distributed SGD algorithm.
Threat models. We find that using DBCL, the attack launched by a malicious client does not work
at all. Instead, we study a more challenging threat: can DBCL defend a malicious server? We
assume first, the server is honest but curious, second, the server holds a subset of data, and third, the
server knows the true model parameters W and the sketched gradients. The assumptions, especially
the third, make it easy to attack but hard to defend. Let Γi be the sketched gradient of the i-th client;
the server uses ΓiST to approximate the true gradient; see (2). Throughout, the server uses ΓiST for
privacy inference.
Defending the property inference attack (PIA) of [33]. We conduct experiments on the LFW
dataset by following the settings of [33]. We use one server and two clients. The task of collaborative
learning is the gender classification discussed in the LFW experiment in Section 5.2. The collaborative
learning settings are the same as Section 5.2. The attacker (malicious server) seeks to infer whether a
single batch of photos in the victim’s private dataset contain Africans or not.
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The two clients collaboratively train the model on the gender classification task for 20, 000 iterations.
To conduct the PIA, the malicious server needs a set of data; let the server have the same number of
samples as the clients. From the 1, 000th to the 20, 000th iterations, the server uses the true model
parameters and its local dataset to evaluate gradients and use the gradients for training a random
forest for the PIA. In each iteration, the attacker uses its auxiliary data to get 2 gradients with property
and 8 gradients without property. Thus there are 190, 000 gradients for training. We collect one
gradient per iteration from the victim for test; there are 19, 000 test gradients.
After training the random forest, the malicious server uses it for binary classification. It seeks to infer
whether a batch of the victim’s (a client) private images contain Africans or not. The test data are
class-imbalanced: only 3, 800 gradients are from images of Africans, whereas the rest 15, 200 are
from non-Africans. We thus use AUC as the evaluation metric. Without sketching, the AUC is 1.0,
which means the server can exactly tell whether a batch of client’s images contain Africans or not.
Using sketching, the AUC is 0.726. It is much worse than without sketching, which means sketching
makes the PIA less effective. Nevertheless, the AUC is better than random guessing (AUC=0.5),
which means the PIA is still effective to some extent.
Defending the gradient matching attack of [58]. Zhu et al. [58] proposed to recover the victims’
data using model parameters and gradients. They seek to find a batch of images by optimization so
that the resulting gradient matches the observed gradient of the victim. We use the same CNNs as
[58] to conduct experiments on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. We apply sketching to all except
the output layer.
In figure 4, we show the recovered images. DBCL successfully defends the gradient-matching attack
conducted by the server. What the malicious server knows is the exact model parameters W, but
the sketching makes the gradients much different. Matching the gradients transformed by sketching
cannot produce the original images.
iter=0 iter=60 iter=120 iter=180 iter=240 groundtruth
without sketch
with sketch
without sketch
with sketch
Figure 4: The images are generated by the gradient-matching attack of [58]. The attack is effective
for the standard CNNs. Using sketching, the gradient-matching attack cannot recover the images.
6 Theoretical Insights
In Section 6.1, we discuss how a malicious client makes use of the sketched model parameters for
privacy inference. In Sections 6.2, we show that DBCL can defend certain types of attacks. In
Section 6.3, we give an explanation of DBCL from optimization perspective.
6.1 Approximating the Gradient
Assume the attacker controls a client and participate in collaborative learning. Let Wold and Wnew
be the parameter matrices of two consecutive iterations; they are unknown to the clients. What a
client sees are the sketches, W˜old = WoldSold and W˜new = WnewSnew. To conduct gradient-based
attacks, the attacker must know the gradient ∆ = Wold −Wnew.
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Naively using W˜old and W˜new does not work. The difference between sketched parameters, ∆˜ =
W˜old − W˜new, is entirely different from the real gradient, ∆ = Wold −Wnew.4 We can even vary
the sketch size s with iterations so that W˜old and W˜new have different number of columns, making it
impossible to compute ∆˜.
Note that the clients know also Sold and Snew. A smart attacker, who knows random matrix theory,
may want to use
∆̂ = WoldSoldS
T
old −WnewSnewSTnew
to approximate ∆, because ∆̂ is an unbiased estimate of ∆, i.e., E
[
∆̂
]
= ∆, where the expectation
is taken w.r.t. the random sketching matrices Sold and Snew.
6.2 Defending Gradient-Based Attacks
We analyze the attack that uses ∆̂. We first give an intuitive explanation and then prove that using ∆̂
does not work, unless the magnitude of ∆ is smaller than Wnew.
Matrix sketching as implicit noise. As ∆̂ is an unbiased estimate of ∆, the reader may wonder
why ∆̂ does not disclose the information of ∆. We give an intuitive explanation. Note that ∆̂ is a
mix of ∆ (which is the signal) and a random transformation of Wnew (which is random noise):
∆̂ = ∆︸︷︷︸
signal
SoldS
T
old + Wnew
(
SoldS
T
old − SnewSTnew
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
zero-mean noise
. (3)
As the magnitude of W is much greater than ∆,5 the noise outweighs the signal, making ∆̂ far from
∆. From the attacker’s perspective, random sketching is just like random noise which outweighs the
signal.
Defending the property inference attack (PIA) of [33]. To conduct the PIA of [33], the attacker
may want to use a linear model parameterized by V.6 According to (1), the attacker uses ∆−A as
input features for PIA, where A is some fixed matrix known to the attacker. The linear model makes
prediction by Y , (∆−A)VT . Using ∆̂ to approximate ∆, the prediction is Ŷ , (∆̂−A)VT .
Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 show that ‖Ŷ −Y‖2F = ‖∆̂VT −∆VT ‖2F is very big.
Theorem 1. Let Sold and Snew be din × s CountSketch matrices and s < din. Let wpq be the (p, q)-th
entry of Wold ∈ Rdout×din and w˜pq be the (p, q)-th entry of Wnew ∈ Rdout×din . Let V be any r × din
matrix and vpq be the (p, q)-th entry of V. Then
E
∥∥∆̂VT −∆VT∥∥2
F
=
1
s
dout∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
∑
k 6=l
(
w2ikv
2
jl + wikvjkwilvjl + w˜
2
ikv
2
jl + w˜ikvjkw˜ilvjl
)
.
The bound in Theorem 1 is involved. To interpret the bound, we add (somehow unrealistic) assump-
tions and obtain Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. Let S be a din × s CountSketch matrix and s < din. Assume that the entries of Wold
are IID and that the entries of V are also IID. Then
E
∥∥∆̂VT −∆VT∥∥2
F
= Ω
(din
s
)
· ∥∥WoldVT∥∥2F .
Since the magnitude of ∆ is much smaller than W, especially when W is close to a stationary point,
‖WVT ‖2F is typically greater than ‖∆VT ‖2F . Thus, E‖∆̂VT −∆VT ‖2F is typically bigger than
‖∆VT ‖2F , which implies that using ∆̂ is no better than all-zeros or random guessing.
4The columns of Sold and Snew are randomly permuted. Even if ∆˜ is close to ∆, after randomly permuting
the columns of Sold or Snew, ∆˜ becomes entirely different.
5In machine learning, ∆ is the updating direction, e.g., gradient. The magnitude of gradient is much smaller
than the model parameters W, especially when W is close to a stationary point.
6The conclusion applies also to neural networks because its first layer is such a linear model.
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Defending the gradient matching attack of [58]. The gradient matching attack of [58] can re-
cover the victim’s original data based on the victim’s gradient, ∆i, and the model parameters, W.
Numerical optimization is used to find the data on which the evaluated gradient matches ∆i. To get
∆i, the attacker must know ∆. Using DBCL, no client knows ∆. A smart attacker may want to use
∆̂ in lieu of ∆ because of its unbiasedness. We show in Theorem 3 that this approach does not work.
Theorem 3. Let Sold and Snew be din × s CountSketch matrices and s < din. Then
E
∥∥∆̂−∆∥∥2
F
= Ω
(din
s
)
·
(∥∥Wold∥∥2F + ∥∥Wnew∥∥2F).
Theorem 3 is a trivial consequence of Theorem 1. Since the magnitude of ∆ is typically smaller than
W, Theorem 3 guarantees that using ∆̂ is no better than all-zeros or random guessing.
6.3 Understanding DBCL from Optimization Perspective
We give an explanation of DBCL from optimization perspective. Let us consider the generalized
linear model:
argmin
w
{
f(w) , 1
n
n∑
j=1
`
(
xTi w, yj
)}
, (4)
where (x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn) are the training samples and l(·, ·) is the loss function. If we apply
sketching to a generalized linear model, then the training will be solving the following problem:
argmin
w
{
f˜(w) , ES
[
1
n
n∑
j=1
`
(
xTi SS
Tw, yj
)]}
. (5)
Note that (5) is different from (4). If S is a uniform sampling matrix, then (5) will be empirical
risk minimization with dropout. Prior work [47] proved that dropout is equivalent to adaptive
regularization which can alleviate overfitting. Random projections such as CountSketch have the
same properties as uniform sampling [51], and thus the role of random sketching in (5) can be thought
of as adaptive regularization. This is why DBCL does not hinder prediction accuracy at all.
7 Related Work
Cryptography approaches such as secure aggregation [5], homomorphic encryption [1, 15, 16, 28, 56],
Yao’s garbled circuit protocol [38], and many other methods [53, 55] can also improve the security of
collaborative learning. Generative models such as [7, 46] can also improve privacy; however, they
hinder the accuracy and efficiency, and their tuning and deployment are nontrivial. All the mentioned
defenses are not competitive methods of our DBCL; instead, they can be combined with DBCL to
defend more attacks.
Our methodology is based on matrix sketching [20, 11, 17, 30, 51, 10]. Sketching has been applied
to achieve differential privacy [4, 21]. It has been shown that to protect privacy, matrix sketching
has the same effect as injecting random noise. The contemporaneous work [25] applies sketching
to federated learning for the sake of differential privacy. In particular, they apply the sketching to
the gradients which are communicated between clients and server. Note the difference between [25]
and our work: they directly sketch the gradients, whereas we sketch the model parameters. The two
approaches look similar, however, the outcome is very different. Their method substantially hurts test
accuracy, whereas our method does not hurt the accuracy at all.
Our method is developed based on the connection between sketching [51] and dropout training [42];
in particular, if S is uniform sampling, then DBCL is essentially dropout. Our approach is different
from [18] which directly applies matrix sketching to the gradients; DBCL, as well as dropout, applies
matrix sketching to the model parameters. Our approach is similar to the contemporaneous work [22]
which is developed for computational benefits.
Decentralized learning, that is, the clients perform peer-to-peer communication without a central
server, is an alternative to federated learning and has received much attention in recent years [9, 23,
24, 29, 37, 40, 44, 49, 54]. The attacks of [33, 58] can be applied to decentralized learning, and
DBCL can defend the attacks under the decentralized setting. We discuss decentralized learning in
the appendix. The attacks and defense under the decentralized setting will be our future work.
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8 Conclusions
Collaborative learning enables multiple parties to jointly train a model without data sharing. Un-
fortunately, standard distributed optimization algorithms can easily leak participants’ privacy. We
proposed Double-Blind Collaborative Learning (DBCL) for defending gradient-based attacks which
are the most effective privacy inference methods. We showed that DBCL can defeat gradient-based
attacks conducted by malicious clients. Admittedly, DBCL can not defend all kinds of attacks; for
example, if the server is malicious, then the attack of [33] still works, but much less effectively. While
it improves privacy, DBCL does not hurt test accuracy at all and does not much increase the cost of
training. DBCL is easy to use and does not need extra tuning. Our future work will combine DBCL
with cryptographic methods such as homomorphic encryption and secret sharing so that neither client
nor server can infer users’ privacy.
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A Algorithm Derivation
In this section, we derive the algorithm outlined in Section 4. In Section A.1 and A.2, we apply
sketching to dense layer and convolutional layer, respectively, and derive the gradients.
A.1 Dense Layers
For simplicity, we study the case of batch size b = 1 for a dense layer. Let x ∈ R1×din be the input,
W ∈ Rdout×din be the parameter matrix, S ∈ Rdin×s (s < din) be a sketching matrix, and
z = xS(WS)T ∈ R1×dout
be the output (during training). For out-of-sample prediction, sketching is not applied, equivalently,
S = Idin .
In the following, we describe how to propagate gradient from the loss function back to x and W. The
dependence among the variables can be depicted as
input −→ · · · −→ x
W
}
−→ z︸ ︷︷ ︸
the studied layer
−→ · · · −→ loss.
During the backpropagation, the gradients propagated to the studied layer are
g , ∂ L
∂ z
∈ R1×dout , (6)
where L is some loss function. Then we further propagate the gradient from z to x and W:
∂ L
∂ x
=
∂ L
∂ z
∂ z
∂ (xS)
∂ (xS)
∂ x
= g(WS)ST ∈ R1×din , (7)
∂ L
∂W
= gT (xS)ST ∈ Rdout×din . (8)
We prove (8) in the following. Let x˜ = xS ∈ R1×s and W˜ = WS ∈ Rdout×s. Let wj: and w˜j: be
the j-th row of W and W˜, respectively. It can be shown that
∂ L
∂ w˜j:
=
dout∑
l=1
∂ L
∂ zl
∂ zl
∂ w˜j:
=
dout∑
l=1
∂ L
∂ zl
∂ (x˜w˜Tl: )
∂ w˜j:
=
∂ L
∂ zj
∂ (x˜w˜Tj:)
∂ w˜j:
= gj x˜ ∈ R1×s.
Thus, w˜j: = wj:S ∈ R1×s; moreover, w˜j: is independent of wl: if j 6= l. It follows that
∂ L
∂wj:
=
∂ L
∂ w˜j:
∂ w˜j:
∂wj:
= gj x˜ S
T ∈ R1×din .
Thus
∂ L
∂W
= gT x˜ ST = gT (xS)ST ∈ Rdout×din .
A.2 Extension to Convolutional Layers
Let X be a d1 × d2 × d3 tensor and K be a k1 × k2 × d3 kernel. The convolution X ∗K outputs
a d1 × d2 matrix (assume zero-padding is used). The convolution can be equivalently written as
matrix-vector multiplication in the following way.
We segment X to many patches of shape k1×k2×d3 and then reshape every patch to a din , k1k2d3-
dimensional vector. Let pi be the i-th patch (vector). Tensor X has q , d1d2 such patches. Let
P , [p1, · · · ,pq]T ∈ Rq×din
be the concatenation of the patches. Let w ∈ Rdin be the vectorization of the kernel K ∈ Rk1×k2×d3 .
The matrix-vector product, z = Pw ∈ Rq , is indeed the vectorization of the convolution X ∗K.
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In practice, we typically use multiple kernels for the convolution; let W , [w1, · · · ,wdout ]T ∈
Rdout×din be the concatenation of dout different (vectorized) kernels. In this way, the convolution of X
with dout different kernels, which outputs a d1 × d2 × r tensor, is the reshape of XWT ∈ Rq×dout .
We show in the above that tensor convolution can be equivalently expressed as matrix-matrix
multiplication. Therefore, we can apply matrix sketching to convolutional layers in the same way
as the dense layer. Specifically, let S be a din × s random sketching matrix. Then XS(WS)T is an
approximation to XWT , and the backpropagation is accordingly derived using matrix differentiation.
B Proofs
In this section, we prove Theorem 1 and Corollary 2. Theorem 1 follows from Lemmas 4 and 5.
Corollary 2 follows from Lemma 6.
Lemma 4. Let Sold and Snew be independent CountSketch matrices. For any matrix V independent
of Sold and Snew, the following identity holds:
E
∥∥∆̂VT −∆VT∥∥2
F
= E
∥∥WoldVT −WoldSoldSToldVT∥∥2F + E∥∥WnewVT −WnewSnewSTnewVT∥∥2F ,
where the expectation is taken w.r.t. the random sketching matrices Sold and Snew.
Proof. Recall the definitions: ∆ = Wold −Wnew and ∆̂ = WoldSoldSTold −WnewSnewSTnew. Then∥∥∆̂VT −∆VT∥∥2
F
=
∥∥∥(WoldSoldSTold −WnewSnewSTnew)VT −∆VT∥∥∥2
F
=
∥∥∥(WoldSoldSTold −WnewSnewSTnew)VT − (Wold −Wnew)VT∥∥∥2
F
=
∥∥∥Wold(SoldSTold − I)VT + Wnew(I− SnewSTnew)VT∥∥∥2
F
=
∥∥Wold(SoldSTold − I)VT∥∥2F + ∥∥Wnew(I− SnewSTnew)VT∥∥2F
+ 2
〈
Wold
(
SoldS
T
old − I
)
VT , Wnew
(
I− SnewSTnew
)
VT
〉
.
Since E[SoldSTold − I] = 0, E[SnewSTnew − I] = 0, and Sold and Snew are independent, we have
E
[〈
Wold
(
SoldS
T
old − I
)
VT , Wnew
(
I− SnewSTnew
)
VT
〉]
= 0.
It follows that
E
∥∥∆̂VT −∆VT∥∥2
F
= E
∥∥Wold(SoldSTold − I)VT∥∥2F + E∥∥Wnew(I− SnewSTnew)VT∥∥2F ,
by which the lemma follows.
Lemma 5. Let S be a d× s CountSketch matrix. Let A ∈ Rn×d and B ∈ Rm×d be any non-random
matrices. Then
E
[
ASSTBT −ABT ]2 = 1
s
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
(∑
k 6=l
a2kib
2
lj +
∑
k 6=l
akibkjaliblj
)
.
Proof. [36, 50] showed that for any vectors a,b ∈ Rd,
E
[
aTSSTb
]
= aTb,
E
[
aTSSTb− aTb]2 = 1
s
(∑
k 6=l
a2kb
2
l +
∑
k 6=l
akbkalbl
)
.
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Let ai: ∈ Rd be the i-th row of A ∈ Rn×d and bj: ∈ Rd be the j-th column of B ∈ Rm×d. Then,
E
[
ASSTBT −ABT ]2 = n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
E
[
aTi:SS
Tbj: − aTi:bj:
]2
=
1
s
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
(∑
k 6=l
a2ikb
2
jl +
∑
k 6=l
aikbjkailbjl
)
,
by which the lemma follows.
Lemma 6. Let S be a d× s CountSketch matrix. Assume that the entries of A are IID and that the
entries of B are also IID. Then
E
[
ATSSTB−ATB]2 = Θ(d
s
)
‖ABT ‖2F .
Proof. Assume all the entries of A are IID sampled from a distribution with mean µA and standard
deviation σA; assume all the entries of B are IID sampled from a distribution with mean µB and
standard deviation σB . It follows from Lemma 5 that
E
[
ASSTBT −ABT ]2 = mn
s
[
(d2 − d)(µ2A + σ2A)(µ2B + σ2B) + (d2 − d)µ2Aµ2B
]
= Θ
(mnd2
s
(µ2A + σ
2
A)(µ
2
B + σ
2
B)
)
= Θ
(d
s
)
‖ABT ‖2F .
C Decentralized Learning
Instead of relying on a central server, multiple parties can collaborate using such a peer-to-peer
network as Figure 5. A client is a compute node in the graph and connected to a few neighboring
nodes. Many decentralized optimization algorithms have been developed [3, 54, 40, 9, 27, 24, 44].
The nodes collaborate by, for example, aggregating its neighbors’ model parameters, taking a
weighted average of neighbors’ and its own parameters as the intermediate parameters, and then
locally performing an SGD update.
Figure 5: Decentralized learning in a peer-to-
peer network.
We find that the attacks of [33, 58] can be applied
to this kind of decentralized learning. Note that a
node shares its model parameters with its neighbors.
If a node is malicious, it can use its neighbors’ gra-
dients and model parameters to infer their data. Let
a neighbor’s (the victim) parameters in two consec-
utive rounds be Wold and Wnew. The difference,
∆ = Wold −Wnew, is mainly the gradient evaluated
on the victim’s data.7 With the model parameters W
and updating direction ∆ at hand, the attacker can
perform the gradient-based attacks of [33, 58].
Our DBCL can be easily applied under the decentral-
ized setting: two neighboring compute nodes agree upon the random seeds, sketching their model
parameters, and communicate the sketches. This can stop any node from knowing, ∆ = Wold−Wnew,
i.e., the gradient of the neighbor. We will empirically study the decentralized setting in our future
work.
7Besides the victim’s gradient, ∆ contains the victim’s neighbors’ gradients, but their weights are usually
lower than the victim’s gradient.
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